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iii

ARGUMENT
I. THERE ARE DISPUTED EVIDENTIARY MATTERS NECESSARY FOR A TRIER
OF FACT REGARDING SMITH'S CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE.
It must be remembered that, "[i]t is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed material
facts in ruling on a summary judgment. It matters not that the evidence on one side may appear
to be strong or even compelling. One sworn statement under oath is all that is needed to dispute
the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding the
entry of summary judgment." Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah Ct.
App. 1988) (citations omitted).
Smith's raises issue with two important issues of fact: (1) the source of the water, and (2)
how long the spill had been on the floor prior to Mrs. Price's fall.
One compelling statement made under oath by Smith's store manager was that "I am
almost 100 percent sure [the water] came from . . . I am sure that that water belonged to
[Pyggy]." R. 298.
Mr. Brown's sworn statement goes well beyond "speculation and conjecture" to establish
the source of the water.
Precluding a jury from deciding the sufficiency of the time elapsed between the cleanup
of Pyggy's workstation and the injury, as would be necessary to show constructive knowledge, is
precisely the type of issue of material fact that is outside of the prerogative of the District Court
to decide. Specifically, "if there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of fact, the
doubt should be resolved in favor of the opposing party.11 Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434,
436 (Utah 1982). Smith's store manager has already established in deposition that
approximately ten minutes passed from the time of the alleged spill to the time of the injury. R.
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278. However, it remains a stark issue of material fact as to whether that time frame is accurate,
and whether such time created constructive knowledge for a reasonable time for Smith's to
remedy the dangerous condition.
Construing the facts most favorably to Mrs. Price would entitle her to go forward.
Contrary to the findings of the Trial Court, significant evidence was presented which requires a
trier of fact to determine whether or not such an amount of time passing between the alleged spill
and the injury was reasonable for the Defendant to create constructive knowledge and remedy
the hazard, thus precluding Summary Judgment from being rendered. Again, only some
evidence of the length of time the problem existed is required. Ohlson v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,
568 P.2d 753 (Utah 1977) (where the court found the Plaintiff produced evidence of the length of
time the problem existed by merely discussing the condition of the broken spaghetti that caused
the Plaintiff to fall).
Here, Pyggy took down its demonstration table at 4:40 p.m., and left the store by 5:00
p.m. R. 177. Shortly after 5:00 p.m. Judy Price went with her granddaughter to buy
strawberries. R. 250, 303. Mrs. Price thinks the accident happened after 5:00, around 5:20. Mr.
Brown thought the water was on the floor for maybe ten minutes. R. 278, 301.
The conflicting evidence as to the time elapsed between the spill and the fall is the
precise issue of material fact that requires weighing by a jury.
In addition, the amount of time the problem existed for the first prong of the Allen test
should be irrelevant. Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, 538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975). In order
to prove constructive notice Allen requires (1) that the condition existed long enough that
defendant should have discovered it, and (2) that after such constructive knowledge, sufficient
time elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care the defendant should have remedied it. Id.
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Mrs. Price's theory of duty and breach is that Smith's should have checked Pyggy's
demonstration area at the moment Pyggy checked out of the store, which they admittedly did not
do. Kent Steele, previously a Health and Safety Manager for 1300 Safeway stores, stated that
demonstrator areas are typical areas to anticipate spillage and that Smith's conduct fell below the
standard of care by not providing a clean area upon the demonstrator's departure from the store.
R. 253-256. Smith's admittedly did not check that area of the store upon the demonstrators'
departure. R. 280, 295, 299, & 359. Thus, the first prong of Allen should be irrelevant—the
condition existed long enough that the defendant should have discovered it. Further, it is clear
that Smith's did not clean up the mess in a reasonable time. Mr. Brown testified that the mess
was cleaned up quickly with paper towels. R. 278-279 at p. 47. It certainly wouldn't have taken
ten minutes to gather paper towels and wipe up a small water spot. Therefore, Mrs. Price can
meet the second element of Allen— that after such constructive knowledge, sufficient time
elapsed that in the exercise of reasonable care the defendant should have remedied the problem.
Mrs. Price has met both elements of the Allen test and this matter should be remanded to
the trial court. Yet, if Mrs. Price has not met the first element of the Allen test it should be
irrelevant because Smith's should have had constructive notice, by not exercising reasonable
care, when they failed to check the demonstrator's area when Pyggy checked out.
II. SMITH'S SHOULD BE VICARIOUSLY LIABLE FOR PYGGY'S NEGLIGENCE
Because Pyggy failed in its obligation to maintain the area of the Smith's store where it
demonstrated products, Smith's should be vicariously liable for the harm that resulted from
Pyggy's failure to use reasonable care.
The actual or constructive notice test would not apply to Pyggy's negligence because
Pyggy created the dangerous condition. "[I]f the condition.. .was created by the defendant.. .the
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notice requirement does not apply." Jex v. JRA, Inc., 166 P.3d 655, 658 (Utah Ct. App. 2007),
quoting Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah Ct App. 1991). Silcox held
that it is for the jury to decide whether one of defendant's employees created the risk of harm, or
whether a phantom shopper created the spill, regardless of whether the store was on notice of the
spill. Id at p. 625. Thus, Pyggy can be negligent, regardless of actual or constructive notice, if
they created the dangerous condition.
It was previously undisputed that Pyggy created the spill. R. 150 & 260. Smith's
answered an interrogatory stating that "[t]he water on the store's floor came from a cup of water
that Stephen Tyler, an employee of independent contractor [Pyggy] spilled and failed to clean up
before leaving the store premises shortly before Plaintiffs alleged accident." R. 260.
Therefore, it was undisputed that Pyggy created the water spill and that they failed to clean it up.
The question then becomes whether Smith's can be vicariously liable for Pyggy's
negligence. Section II of Mrs. Price's Appellate brief discusses the question of whether Smith's
can be liable for Pyggy's actions. See Judy Price's Appellate Brief at pp.12-16. Smith's raised
two arguments in response to this issue. First, it is important to note that Smith's did not deny
that the law should recognize liability for independent contractors where a "non-delegable duty"
or "absolute duty" exists. In addition, they did not dispute that a non-delegable or absolute duty
exists here.
The issues raised by Smith's are that (1) there is no evidence that Smith's ever delegated
its duty to maintain its store in a reasonably safe condition to Pyggy, (2) that there is no evidence
Pyggy was an independent contractor retained by Smith's to maintain Smith's premises, and (3)
that there is no evidence that the demonstrator was the origin of the water spill. See Smith's
Appellate brief at p. 11.
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Did Smith's delegate its duty to maintain its store in a reasonable safe condition? Pyggy
was abiding by "store policy" by being responsible for cleaning the floor of the demonstration
area. R. 281 at p.22. See also R. 283 at p. 15 (where Smith's store manager said that Smith's
doesn't oversee the operation of the demonstrators because the demonstrators are on their own),
R. 281 p. 23 (where the demonstrators bring their own cleaning supplies). Thus, Smith's
delegated its duty to maintain the area of the fall to Pyggy.
Is there evidence that Pyggy was an (a) independent contractor (b) retained by Smith's to
maintain Smith's premises? Smith's answered an interrogatory explaining that the water came
from the "independent contractor" Pyggy. R. 260. Smith's motion for summary judgment also
termed Pyggy as an independent contractor. R. 246. Next, Smith's improperly frames the issue
regarding maintenance to require that the independent contractor be "retained." The occupier
will be liable for the negligence of an independent contractor to whom he entrusts maintenance
and repair." Handbook of Law of Torts § 61 (4 ed. 1971). There is no requirement that the
independent contractor be retained. Id. In addition, in a case very similar to this matter, the
>

court was careful to point out that the exact nature of the relationship between the store and the
food demonstrator was unimportant because the store, like Smith's here, stood to gain from the
demonstrator's activities. Little v. Butner, 348 P.2d 1022, 1032 (Kan. 1960).
Is there evidence that the demonstrator was the origin of the water spill? On numerous
occasions Smith's admitted that Pyggy was the source of the water spill. R. 260 (in Smith's
answers to Mrs. Price's interrogatories Smith's stated that the water on the floor came from a cup
of water that Pyggy spilled and failed to clean up), R. 278-279 at p.44-45 (where Smith's store
manager stated that he was almost 100 percent sure the water came from Pyggy). Please note
that although pages 44 and 45 of Mr. Brown's deposition were included in Mrs. Price's response
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to Smith's motion for summary judgment those pages were somehow skipped when the record
was paginated for appeal Smith's now seeks to back off its prior answers to interrogatories and
responses to deposition questions to muddy the waters regarding the source of the water. Clearly
there is evidence that Pyggy was the source of the water.
Smith's also argues that holding Smith's liable in this case would create a strict liability
standard for stores for any problems that arise inside a store. Defendant's conclusion is
incorrect. Every plaintiff would still be required to prove negligence on the part of the
independent contractor in the independent contractor's maintenance of an absolute or nondelegable duty in order to prove his/her claim. Stores cannot be vicariously liable for the
negligence of their independent contractors if their independent contractors are not negligent.
In summary, there is convincing evidence that Pyggy was the source of the water spill,
and that Pyggy was an independent contractor to whom Smith's delegated the duty of
maintenance. For those reasons, Smith's should be vicariously liable for Pyggy's negligence.
III. SMITH'S REGULAR FLOOR INSPECTIONS ARE IRRELEVANT BECAUSE
SMITH'S SHOULD HAVE CHECKED THE DEMONSTRATOR AREA WHEN PYGGY
CHECKED OUT.
Again, Mrs. Price's theory of duty and breach is that Smith's should have checked
Pyggy's demonstration area when Pyggy checked out of the store, which they admittedly did not
do. R. 280, 295, 299, & 359. Smith's has argued that it simply could not be negligent because it
conducted twelve formal floor inspections between 4:24 p.m. and 5:59 p.m. Smith's Appellate
Brief at p. 11. First, Mrs. Price's theory of negligence is that if Smith's would have checked the
area of the store where Pyggy had been when the demonstrator checked out then Mrs. Price's fall
would not have occurred, regardless of who created the water spill. Kent Steele, previously a
Health and Safety Manager for 1300 Safeway stores, stated that demonstrator areas are typical
6

areas to anticipate spillage and that Smith's conduct fell below the standard of care by not
providing a clean area upon the demonstrator's departure from the store. R. 253-256. Thus, the
number of regular floor inspections is irrelevant to Mrs. Price's theory of duty and breach.
Second, it is somewhat troubling that Smith's claims it inspected a nearly 80,000 square
foot store eight times in a thirty-four minute period. R. 278-79, at p.46 (stating that the store is
nearly 80,000 square feet). This highlights the need for a jury to determine the reasonableness of
Smith's assertions.
Nevertheless, the alleged number of inspections should not protect Smith's from their
breach of reasonable care in this matter.
CONCLUSION
Mrs. Price respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District Court's ruling granting
Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment. Mrs. Price has produced evidence of the amount of
time the water was on the floor sufficient to survive summary judgment. In addition, Smith's
should be vicariously liable for Pyggy's actions. Mrs. Price respectfully requests that the Court
remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.
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